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Abstract 
The patent system is broken and in dire need of reform; so says the 
popular press, scholars, lawyers, judges, congresspersons, and even the 
President. One common complaint is that patents are now failing as 
property rights because their boundaries are not as clear as the fences 
that demarcate real estate—patent infringement is neither as determinate 
nor as efficient as trespass is for land. This Essay explains that this is a 
fallacious argument, suffering both empirical and logical failings. 
Empirically, there are no formal studies of trespass litigation rates; thus, 
complaints about the patent system’s indeterminacy are based solely on 
an idealized theory of how trespass should function, which economists 
identify as the “nirvana fallacy.” Furthermore, anecdotal evidence and 
other studies suggest that boundary disputes between landowners are 
neither as clear nor as determinate as patent scholars assume them to be. 
Logically, the comparison of patent boundaries to trespass commits 
what philosophers call a “category mistake.” It conflates the boundaries 
of an entire legal right (a patent), not with the boundaries of its 
conceptual counterpart (real estate), but with a single doctrine (trespass) 
that secures real estate only in a single dimension (physical fences). As 
all law students learn in their first-year Property courses, estate 
boundaries are defined along the dimensions of time, use, and space, as 
represented in doctrines like future interests, easements, nuisance, and 
restrictive covenants, among others. The proper conceptual analog for 
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patent boundaries is “estate boundaries,” not fences. In sum, the trespass 
fallacy is driving widely accepted critiques of today’s patent system that 
are empirically unverified and conceptually misleading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The conventional wisdom today is that the patent system is broken 
and it needs to be fixed. It is expressed in both the popular press1 and 
academic scholarship.2 In a series of high-profile judicial opinions, 
articles and blog postings, Judge Richard Posner has been criticizing the 
“serious problems with our patent system.”3 The Supreme Court 
appears to agree, as it is now deciding patent cases at a rate not seen 
since the nineteenth century.4 In just the October 2012 Term, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-
can-stifle-competition.html; Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/all; James Temple, 
Google Lawyer: Why the Patent System is Broken, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2011, at E1, available 
at 2011 WLNR 22874588; Tim Worstall, The Patent System Really Is Broken if Someone Is 
Trolling Apple for This, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/ 
11/29/the-patent-system-really-is-broken-if-someone-is-trolling-apple-for-this. 
 2. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2–3 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 1, 4–6 (2009); ADAM B. 
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM 
IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 171 (2004). 
 3. Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 
2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-
many-patents-in-america/259725/; accord Richard A. Posner, Patent Trolls—Posner, BECKER-
POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-
trollsposner.html; see Dan Levine, Judge Who Shelved Apple Trial Says Patent System Out of 
Sync, REUTERS (July 5, 2012, 8:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-apple-
google-judge-idUSBRE8640IQ20120705?irpc=932. 
 4. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 321, 321–22 (2009) (comparing seven cert grants between 2005 and 2008 to the eight 
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foreclosed the patent system to discoveries of isolated DNA and 
imposed antitrust review of settlements of patent infringement lawsuits 
involving pharmaceutical drugs.5 Regulatory agencies also have skin in 
the patent reform game: In January 2013, the Federal Trade 
Commission reached a settlement with Google in which the firm agreed 
to restrict its enforcement of patents committed to standard setting 
organizations,6 and the agency is now considering whether to bring 
enforcement actions against patent licensing companies.7 Congress was 
even awoken from its deadlocked slumber by the clarion call for reform 
of the patent system, enacting the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).8 
On February 14, 2013, President Barack Obama declared that even the 
AIA was not enough, stating “that our efforts at patent reform only went 
about halfway to where we need to go.”9 By mid-summer 2013, six bills 
were formally introduced in Congress to further revise the patent 
system.10 
The complaints today about the patent system run the gamut—from 
patents being granted on discoveries or inventions that should be 
excluded from the patent system11 to massive litigation in the “smart 
                                                                                                                     
cases decided by the Court in 1853). Between 2009 and 2013, the Court decided twelve patent 
cases. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html#!/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2013) (listing cases). In the nineteenth century, the Court did not have discretionary 
control over its docket, and thus it heard numerous patent cases. See John F. Duffy, The Federal 
Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (2010). 
 5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(holding that discoveries of isolated DNA are unpatentable); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (holding that “reverse settlements” in pharmaceutical patent litigation are subject to 
antitrust review). 
 6. See Motorola Mobility, LLC, FTC File No. 121-0120 (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724googlemotorolado.pdf (final decision and order 
amending and replacing decision and order first issued on January 3, 2013). 
 7. See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at Patent 
Assertion Entity Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012) (transcript at 4), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/121210paeworkshop.pdf.  
 8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 9. Casey Newton, Obama: We’re Only Halfway There on Patent Reform, CNET (Feb. 
14, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57569499-93/obama-were-only-
halfway-there-on-patent-reform/. 
 10. Robert Wager, Survey of Proposed Patent Lawsuit Reform Bills in Congress (Part 3), 
PIT IP TECH BLOG (July 25, 2013), http://pitiptechblog.com/2013/07/25/survey-of-proposed-
patent-lawsuit-reform-bills-in-congress-part-3. 
 11. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (rejecting as 
an unpatentable “law of nature” a medical treatment method covering correlations of doses of 
medication with toxicity levels in the blood); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (rejecting 
as an unpatentable “abstract idea” a business method covering hedging of risk in the sale of 
commodities). 
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phone wars” allegedly imposing ruinous costs on inventors and firms.12 
But one common refrain is that patents are now just too vague and 
indeterminate to function properly as property rights. This 
“indeterminacy critique” undergirds many of the complaints about why 
the patent system is broken; for instance, Justice Anthony Kennedy has 
complained that improperly granted patents on business methods are a 
problem because they are vague and indeterminate.13  
The indeterminacy critique has particular traction in the public 
policy debates about software patents, and commentators have proposed 
reforms ranging from outright elimination of software patents to 
doctrinal tweaks in how software patents are issued and enforced.14 
Academic conferences are now dedicated solely to how best to fix “the 
software patent problem,”15 and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
has held a series of roundtable discussions “to enhance the quality of 
software-related patents.”16 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held out hope that it would resolve the issue of whether software 
patents are valid in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.17 But the en 
banc court fractured badly on the question—no opinion garnered a 
majority on the question of whether software patents are valid—which 
ensured only ongoing uncertainty and a cert petition to the Supreme 
Court.18 
More generally, the indeterminacy critique is compelling in the 
patent policy debates because patents are legal documents that must be 
interpreted by judges, investors, competitors, and inventors in various 
institutional and market contexts. In patent litigation, the interpretation 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See, e.g., Paul Barrett, Apple’s Patent War Seen Leading to Retaliatory Strikes, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
29/apple.html. 
 13. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (complaining about the “potential vagueness and suspect validity” of “patents over 
business methods”). 
 14. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 187–214 (discussing generally the many 
problems caused by “abstract” and vague software patent claims); Mark A. Lemley, Software 
Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 
2117302, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302 (proposing limiting software patents through 
a stricter interpretation of § 112 of the 1952 Patent Act); Mark Cuban, My Suggestion on Patent 
Law, BLOG MAVERICK (Aug. 7, 2011, 1:58 PM), http://blogmaverick.com/2011/08/07/my-
suggestion-on-patent-law (proposing eliminating software patents in part because “[u]ncertainty 
is never good”). 
 15. See Solutions to the Software Patent Problem, SANTA CLARA L. (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://law.scu.edu/hightech/2012-solutions-to-the-software-patent-problem.cfm.  
 16. See Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for 
Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 292–93 (Jan. 3, 2013). 
 17. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 18. See 82 U.S.L.W. 359 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2013) (No. 13-298).  
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of patents by courts, especially of the patent claims that define the 
“metes and bounds” of the property right in the invention,19 is viewed 
by many scholars as being in disarray. Recent studies report that the 
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate on claim interpretation issues is between 
33.3% and 44%.20 Some studies report that the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of a patent is heavily panel dependent.21 One former 
federal district court judge, Samuel Kent, famously complained after a 
string of reversals that the Federal Circuit is full of “little green men 
who don’t know Tuesday from Philadelphia.”22 Some patent scholars 
thus refer to patents as “probabilistic” or “contingent” property rights 
because they argue that the precise scope of the property right is unclear 
until an infringement lawsuit has run its full course, including the result 
of the inevitable—and unpredictable—appeal to the Federal Circuit.23  
Many other scholars have responded to these criticisms with 
counter-studies of patents,24 but this Essay makes a more fundamental 
point: the indeterminacy critique is deeply mistaken in a way that 
cannot be corrected by merely producing more empirical studies of the 
patent system. To be clear, the indeterminacy critique as such is not 
improper or invalid. The lack of clarity in the law is a legitimate basis 
for calls for reform. But the indeterminacy critique, like all normative 
evaluations, is based on a standard of judgment. The indeterminacy 
critique is based on the assumption that patents should function just as 
trespass doctrine does in real property—the former should be as clear 
and as determinate as the latter. This appeal to trespass is fundamentally 
mistaken on both conceptual and empirical grounds, and as a result it 
has produced an unsound and unverified normative critique in the patent 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 20. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting 44% rate in appellate 
modifications of district courts’ claim constructions); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight 
Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 
(2005) (reporting a 34.5% claim construction reversal rate); Michael Saunders, Note, A Survey 
of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 236 (2007) (reporting 
a 33.3% claim construction reversal rate); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the 
Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 711, 745–46 (2003) (reporting a 41.5% claim construction reversal rate).  
 21. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163 (2004). 
 22. Victoria Slind-Flor, The ‘Markman’ Prophecies, LAW.COM (Mar. 12, 2002), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005528997. 
 23. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probablistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 
(Spring 2005). 
 24.  See, e.g., Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and 
Software Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 67 (reporting that PTO rejection rates for 
patent applications on software are consistent with other technologies). 
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policy debates that is driving court decisions, agency actions, and 
legislation.  
This Essay will explain in three Parts how patent law scholarship 
and jurisprudence is dominated by a “trespass fallacy” and why this 
matters. First, it will describe how judges and commentators have long 
analogized patent infringement to trespass, and how the indeterminacy 
critique turns this analogy on its head by converting it into an allegedly 
robust normative standard of evaluation. The result is a fallacy—what 
this Essay calls the “trespass fallacy.” It is a fallacy in two respects: one 
is conceptual and the other is empirical, and the last two Parts of this 
Essay will explain why this is so. The conceptual error consists of what 
philosophers call a “category mistake.” It conflates an entire legal right 
(title) with a single doctrine (trespass) that secures this title only in a 
single dimension (geographic boundaries). In sum, it compares two 
legal concepts that are incommensurate with each other. The empirical 
error is that there are no formal empirical studies of how trespass or 
other real estate boundaries function in litigation; thus, the 
indeterminacy critique uses only an idealized theory of how trespass is 
supposed to function as an alleged empirical standard of comparison in 
evaluating the efficiency of the patent system. Economists have long 
identified this improper comparison between idealized theory and 
empirical reality as a “nirvana fallacy.”25 In sum, the trespass fallacy is 
driving an indeterminacy critique in patent law that is unverified and 
misleading. In the words of the advocates of the indeterminacy critique, 
it “substitutes rhetoric for reasoned policy.”26 
I.  PATENTS AS TITLE DEEDS AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS 
TRESPASS 
It is neither surprising nor unusual for courts and commentators 
today to analogize patent infringement to trespass. Patents have long 
been identified as property rights in American law. Early American 
courts conceptualized patents in the same terms as common law 
property rights, and thus they relied on and employed concepts, 
doctrines, and rhetoric from real property in crafting the doctrines that 
now comprise the American patent system.27  
                                                                                                                     
 25. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 1–2 (1969). 
 26. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 257 (“The problem with mistaking abstract 
conceptions of property for the real thing is that this substitutes rhetoric for reasoned 
policy . . . .”). 
 27. See Adam Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions: Lessons for 
Modern Patent Theory from Classic Patent Doctrine, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 345, 345–77 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. 
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From the very first years of the American patent system, courts 
identified patents as “titles” or “title deeds.”28 To take just one 
illustrative example: In 1848, Justice Levi Woodbury, riding circuit, 
instructed a jury in a patent infringement trial that “[a]n inventor holds a 
property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm 
and flock.”29 Patent infringement was thus analogized to “trespass”30 
because, as Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, explained in 
1817, a violation of a patent is “an unlawful invasion of property.”31 
This historical practice of conceptualizing patents as title deeds and 
analogizing patent infringement as trespass continued into the twentieth 
century. The Supreme Court embraced it at the turn of the twentieth 
century,32 and, following its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit 
continued this practice, referring repeatedly to patent claims as that 
“which define the metes and bounds of the invention”33 and to patent 
infringement as “trespass.”34 Thus, no one expressed shock or confusion 
                                                                                                                     
Wright eds., 2011) [hereinafter Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions] 
(discussing property conveyance concepts and doctrines in patent law); Adam Mossoff, Patents 
as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings 
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 700–07 (2007) (discussing protection of patents under the Takings 
Clause); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 989–1009  
(2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege”] (discussing property concepts, 
doctrines and rhetoric in patent law).  
 28. See Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 994 & n.194 
(listing numerous nineteenth-century cases in which judges identified patents as titles). 
 29. Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742) (Woodbury, 
Circuit Justice). 
 30. Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 993 & n.192 (listing 
patent cases referring to or citing common law cases involving trespass). 
 31. Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,719) (Washington, 
Circuit Justice). 
 32. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 
(1917) (explaining that the “scope of every patent . . . . ha[s] been aptly likened to the 
description in a deed”) (citations omitted)); United States. v. Société Anonyme Des Anciens 
Etablissements Cail, 224 U.S. 309, 311 (1912) (explaining that “the question being only for the 
present whether such use was a trespass upon the rights of the claimant”). 
 33. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 
Kara Tech. Inc., v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is the claims that 
define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s invention.”); Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C., 
178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of 
the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the protected invention.” (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 
U.S. 605, 607 (1950))); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which 
the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected 
invention.” (citing Graver, 339 U.S. at 607)). 
 34. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007); accord Hoechst-Roussel 
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when Judge Frank Easterbrook stated at a conference in 1990 that 
“[p]atents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with 
real property.”35  
In recent years, though, patent scholars have fixated on the trespass 
analogy and on the related simile that patent claims are the equivalent of 
fences around a parcel of land.36 As one patent scholar bluntly puts the 
point: “Patent law is about building fences.”37 Of course, as will be 
explained later, there is a subtle conflation here between metes and 
bounds and fences, i.e., between the description in a deed of the 
boundaries of the legal concept of real estate and the physical 
demarcation of a parcel of earth secured as real estate. The important 
point here is that patent scholars took an analogy and a related simile 
that originally served an explanatory function in framing the property 
doctrines in patent law and transmogrified it into a normative standard 
for evaluating the operation of the patent system as such. 
This subtle but important shift from descriptive framing device to 
normative standard of evaluation occurred without much comment, but 
it did occur. The invocation of the trespass standard—real property has 
clear physical boundaries secured by a determinate legal doctrine—is 
omnipresent in the ubiquitous complaints today about “the broken 
patent system.” For instance, Professors Michael Meurer and James 
Bessen explicitly state in their book, Patent Failure, that “[a]n ideal 
patent system features rights that are defined as clearly as the fence 
                                                                                                                     
Pharm., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“With respect to direct 
infringement, then, the claims define the patent owner’s property rights whereas infringement is 
the act of trespassing upon those rights.”); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“An act of infringement—i.e., making, using, or selling the patented invention 
‘without authority,’—trespasses on this right to exclude.” (citation omitted)). 
 35. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 109 (1990). 
 36. See, e.g., ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 73 (2d ed. 
2004) (“If patent infringement can be compared to trespassing, the claims serve as the boundary 
markers that define what is, or is not, an encroachment on the inventor’s exclusive territory.”); 
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2010) (“Because patent 
claims define infringement, they are generally regarded as the boundary of a patent, much as the 
boundaries of real property define trespass and the right of exclusion.” (footnote omitted)); 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the 
Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007) (“A patent’s claims define with words the 
limits of the inventor’s exclusive rights, just as physical boundaries may define the limits of real 
property rights.”); Scott G. Ulbrich, Festo, Notice and the Application of Prosecution History 
Estoppel to Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitations, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1165, 1168 
(2002) (“It is helpful to visualize the universe of all patentable subject matter as a large piece of 
real estate. Each patent is defined by the fence around smaller portions of the initial piece of 
land.”). 
 37. Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 
759 (1999). 
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/1
2013] THE TRESPASS FALLACY IN PATENT LAW 1695 
 
around a piece of land.”38 In Fixing Patent Boundaries, Professor Tun-
Jen Chiang contrasts the “vague” and “easily changed” patent claims 
with the “stable boundaries” provided by “a fence that is crystal 
clear.”39 According to Professor Chiang, this is a problem that demands 
a solution because this “lack of stable boundaries . . . has sparked an 
explosion in patent litigation, and acts as a deterrent to productive 
investment in manufacturing, research, and innovation.”40 Other 
scholars use the trespass standard to argue that we should reject the 
claim that patents are conceptually and doctrinally equivalent to 
property rights.41 
In sum, commentators and judges employ a trespass standard to 
evaluate, or more precisely to criticize, the operation of the patent 
system today. It is alleged that trespass doctrine is determinate and 
efficient because fences define clear physical boundaries for real estate. 
Thus, patents, or more precisely patent claims, should be as equally 
clear as fences and thus as equally determinate as trespass doctrine.42 
Yet, everyone seems to agree that patents are vague, indeterminate, and 
inordinately expensive to obtain and to litigate. Patents are 
“probabilistic rights” of indefinite scope; as Professor Chiang laments, 
it is as if “the fence on your land was constantly moving in random 
directions. . . . Because patent claims are easily changed, they serve as 
poor boundaries, undermining the patent system for everyone.”43 Thus, 
the conclusion seems inescapable: the patent system is fundamentally 
                                                                                                                     
 38. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 46. 
 39. Chiang, supra note 36, at 525, 530. 
 40. Id. at 525 (footnote omitted). 
 41. See William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: 
The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 
329 (2009) (explaining that “when determining boundaries, the analogies between patents and 
traditional notions of property rights become less useful and potentially misleading,” and that 
the many real-world differences between the two suggests that “the ‘metes and bounds’ analogy 
is a legal fiction that is, at best, unhelpful and, at worst, misleading”); Mark Lemley, Reply, 
What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097–1100 (2005) 
(arguing that “the economic theory of real property falls short when applied to the rather 
different world of intellectual property” in part because “the law of real property works [given] 
that both the physical and legal boundaries of real property are, in the main, clear” but that 
“[n]either ‘boundary’ is clear in intellectual property law”). 
 42. It is not just academic commentators who invoke the trespass/fence standard for 
evaluating patents. Judges on the Federal Circuit often invoke it, but positively. See, e.g., 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (asserting that “a patent may be thought of as a form of deed which sets out the 
metes and bounds of the property the inventor owns for the term and puts the world on notice to 
avoid trespass or to enable one to purchase all or part of the property right it represents”), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996).  
 43. Chiang, supra note 36, at 530. 
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broken, and the need for reform is as obvious as the sky is blue.44 
II.  TRESPASS AS A FALLACY IN PATENT LAW 
The problem with the trespass standard in patent law is that it is 
fundamentally mistaken—it is conceptually invalid and empirically 
unverified. In converting a descriptive analogy into a normative 
standard, the advocates of the indeterminacy critique have created a 
fallacy—the trespass fallacy. Conceptually, this standard improperly 
compares the boundaries of a complete legal right (patent) with a single 
doctrine (trespass) that constitutes only one part of another legal right 
(real estate). Empirically, this standard asserts without any actual proof 
whatsoever that boundary disputes of real estate are clear, determinate, 
and efficient. Neither of these points represents an insurmountable 
problem for the indeterminacy critique; it is possible for the critique to 
be reframed and for supporting studies to be done. But until these 
failings are addressed, the indeterminacy critique is based on a fallacy—
it is not a sound argument—and thus it should not be used to justify 
judicial or legislative reforms of the patent system. 
A.  The Trespass Standard as a Logical Fallacy 
Comparing how different types of property rights function in the real 
world is often an important and enlightening inquiry; in fact, it reflects 
the essence of the analogical reasoning at the core of legal analysis. In 
conceptual or policy analyses of legal rights, such comparisons can 
reveal “the appropriate descriptive and normative inputs that go into a 
coherent and comprehensive account of a legal doctrine.”45 For 
instance, these comparisons can reveal how different property rights, 
such as those in land and in inventions, have specific built-in policy 
presumptions that guide their application in varying contexts, whether it 
is securing a domain of liberty in the free use of an asset46 or reducing 
information costs in the efficiency-maximizing uses of assets.47 
But this comparison can only work if it is in fact valid, i.e., if there is 
appropriate conceptual symmetry between the items of comparison. As 
Judge Kent humorously pointed out, one cannot compare “Tuesday” 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 171 (“The primary objective of reform 
should be to reduce the uncertainty that now pervades many aspects of the patent system.”). 
 45. Mossoff, supra note 4, at 370. 
 46. See Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, J. 
TORT L., Sept. 2011, at 1, 3 (“Trade secrecy sounds in property—if and to the extent that one 
agrees that ‘property’ consists conceptually of a right securing a normative interest in 
determining exclusively the use of an external asset.”).  
 47. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).  
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and “Philadelphia” as conceptual equivalents, at least if one wants to 
engage in rational, coherent discourse.48 This type of identity 
proposition conflates two different concepts as allegedly sharing the 
exact same characteristics; as a matter of logic, it commits what 
philosophers call a “category mistake.”49 
In comparing legal rights for either descriptive or normative 
purposes, it is paramount to bear in mind that a legal right is not the 
same thing as a single doctrine that provides redress for a particular way 
the legal right is violated. Logically, a right or legal entitlement is an 
abstract concept that subsumes a variety of doctrines that secure this 
right in different contexts. In constitutional law, for instance, a “civil 
right” is a concept that encompasses a variety of different legal rights, 
such as the right to free speech, the right to freedom of religion, the 
right to a jury trial, the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure, and the right to due process, among many others. These 
more specific legal rights subsume various doctrines, such as the free 
speech doctrine defining and permitting time–manner–place 
regulations.50 Similarly, a “property right” is a broad concept that 
encompasses a variety of different types of legal rights that secure 
exclusive use in a valued asset or resource, such as a fee simple in land, 
a right to spectrum, a right in oil, a riparian right, a right to corporate 
stock, a right of way, and a right to an invention, among many others. 
Each of these species of rights within the broader category has further 
specific doctrines that apply in the myriad circumstances in which these 
rights are utilized by the right holders or violated by third parties, such 
as the unauthorized diversion of water from a farmer’s stream.51 When 
comparing different types of rights or doctrines subsumed within a 
broader right, a proper comparison of the fundamental policy 
presumptions that unite these rights or doctrines within the broader 
category can be illuminating. However, mistaken conceptual 
comparisons merely obfuscate and ultimately frustrate this same 
analysis.52 
In comparing different property rights, it is important logically to 
recognize that the boundaries of legal title—whether in real estate or a 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 49. See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 55–56 (2d ed. rev. 
2008) (“A category mistake arises when things or facts of one kind are presented as if they 
belonged to another.”). 
 50. E.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(“Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, 
place, or manner restrictions.”). 
 51. See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 333–35 (discussing water rights). 
 52. See id. at 376–77. 
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patent—is not the same thing as trespass doctrine. To claim as identical 
the boundaries of legal title and trespass is tantamount to claiming that 
the broader concept of fruit is identical with an orange rind. This type of 
identity proposition conflates two different concepts as allegedly 
sharing the exact same characteristics; in short, it commits a category 
mistake. Assuming that such comparisons can be valid and that they 
illuminate valid policy issues in property law, logic then requires that 
there be conceptual symmetry between the items of comparison. Thus, 
commentators and judges should compare a patent to its proper 
conceptual counterpart in real property—an estate. 
Somehow the significance of the hoary truism that “patents 
are . . . title deeds”53 has been lost on modern patent commentators and 
courts. All law students learn in their first-year property course that an 
estate is not the same thing as land.54 It is a basic axiom in property law 
that the physical boundaries of a parcel of land are not the same thing as 
the legal boundaries of an estate, which is measured in its most basic 
sense in terms of temporal duration.55 The largest estate, a fee simple 
absolute, is measured not just along the dimension of time; since this 
estate secures exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition,56 it is 
measured along functional and physical dimensions as well.57 This is 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1,434). 
 54. See, e.g., Eaton v. B.C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872) (“In a strict legal sense, 
land is not ‘property,’ but the subject of property.”); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 
(1856) (Seldon, J.) (“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a 
thing. The term, although frequently applied to the thing itself, in strictness means only the 
rights of the owner in relation to it.”). 
 55. See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
33 (4th ed. 2005) (“The theory of estates, a peculiarity of Anglo-American law, is based on the 
concept of ownership measured in terms of time.”); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC 
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 10 (2d ed. 
1899) (“Proprietary rights in land are . . . projected upon the plane of time. The category of 
quantity, of duration, is applied to them.”). 
 56. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945) (explaining that 
“property” has a “vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the 
citizen exercises rights,” but that “in a more accurate sense” the concept of property denotes 
“the right to possess, use and dispose of it”); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) 
(“Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the 
right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.”); Eaton, 51 N.H. at 511 (“Property is the right of any 
person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.” (quoting Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 433 
(Seldon, J.))). 
 57. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318 
(2002) (“Property interests may have many different dimensions. For example, the dimensions 
of a property interest may include a physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of 
the property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner 
may use or dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the 
duration of the property interest).” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/1
2013] THE TRESPASS FALLACY IN PATENT LAW 1699 
 
such a basic fact in the American property system that no one thinks 
twice about how fee simple owners carve up their estates precisely 
along these different dimensions, such as use (easements and restrictive 
covenants) and time (future interests). On the basis of defining patents 
as property, early nineteenth-century American courts secured to patent 
owners the exact same conveyance rights in their “titles,” incorporating 
into patent law the common law property concepts of “assignments” 
and “licenses.”58 
To put the point bluntly, a fence does not define the boundaries of an 
estate, whether in fee simple or in any estate of lesser quantum. For 
property lawyers, this is anything but a surprising statement. Courts 
have long recognized that property rights can be violated without any 
breach of a fence or physical removal of an object from one’s 
possession. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in 1856, 
“Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of 
a thing. . . . A man may be deprived of his property in a chattel, 
therefore, without its being seized or physically destroyed, or taken 
from his possession.”59 
This is why first-year property courses spend little time studying 
common law trespass or conversion.60 Instead, property professors 
spend almost the entirety of their courses studying the doctrines 
securing a property-owner’s rights to possession, use, and enjoyment, 
and the creation and use of estate interests along these dimensions. This 
includes the many doctrines that define and secure the rights of 
possession, use, and disposition, such as adverse possession, finder and 
gift doctrines, possessory estates (e.g., leaseholds, life estates, fee 
simple defeasibles, joint tenancies, etc.), future interests (reversions, 
remainders, and executory interests), easements arising by implication 
from licenses, prescriptive easements, restrictive covenants, and 
nuisance. All of these doctrines define the boundaries of an estate, both 
intensively and extensively, and only a few rely on physical breaches of 
fences to define when this estate has been invaded. 
For example, many property lawsuits arise from disputed wills and 
other title-creating documents, such as a deed creating an easement. 
Accordingly, these disputes often focus on the meaning of words in the 
deed or conveyance instrument, a legal practice that many patent 
lawyers would find eerily similar to the disputes over words in patent 
                                                                                                                     
Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
 58. See generally Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions, supra note 27, 
at 350–56; Mossoff, supra note 4, at 349–60. 
 59. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 433. 
 60. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 69–80, 87–92 (6th ed. 2006); THOMAS 
W. MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1–6, 401–28 (1st ed. 2007). 
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claims. And these real estate disputes are not resolved just by the 
substantive meaning of the legal terms of art or non-technical words 
used within the four corners of the conveyance instrument; rather, 
formal legal rules, such as rules of construction and substantive 
presumptions, play a fundamental and often determinative role in these 
court cases. As patent lawyers know all too well, the same holds true for 
patent disputes, although contrary to many claims, this is not a modern 
artifact of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence. In 
1833, Justice Joseph Story, riding circuit, resolved one complicated 
patent assignment case by looking to “strong[] analogous cases” in the 
common law in which courts recognized the legitimacy of “the deeds” 
conveying land even if a “feoffment is stated without any averment of 
livery of seisin.”61 Such language in patent decisions might send shivers 
down the spines of lawyers who remember all too well having to learn 
such archaic legal terminology in their first-year property courses, much 
of which continues to be in use in property law today. 
In fact, the hyper-technical and highly formalistic estate interests are 
very similar to patents in both content and form. Patent scholars might 
be surprised to learn that the term “incorporeal property” first arose at 
common law in cases involving future interests.62 The similarities, 
though, are deeper than mere terminology. In terms of subject matter, 
disputes over future interests are disputes about the precise scope of the 
estate; the overlapping possessory estates and future interests create 
legal rights and duties between the respective owners of the estate, such 
as the restraints imposed on life tenants by remaindermen.63 Such 
overlapping estate interests are similar to the overlapping patent 
interests covering a single product or process,64 which often precipitates 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Dobson v. Campbell, 7 F. Cas. 783, 785 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 3,945) (Story, 
Circuit Justice). In this case, Circuit Justice Story was required to assess whether the assignment 
“set[] up a title to the patent right” sufficient to support a claim for infringement by the 
plaintiff–assignee. Id. The sticking point was that the assignment was not recorded with the 
Secretary of State, as required by the 1793 Patent Act. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 4, 1 
Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836). Invoking the equity cases upholding real property interests 
transferred without the requisite legal formalities, Circuit Justice Story held that the assignee 
had a sufficient legal interest to sue for infringement. Dobson, 7 F. Cas. at 785. 
 62. See FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN 
THE COMMON LAW 54 (1888) (“With regard to incorporeal hereditaments, such as a reversion, a 
remainder, an advowson, the established theory of our authorities is that, although one may have 
seisin of them by receiving the rent and services, or presenting a clerk to the church, they are not 
the subjects of livery of seisin; they lie in grant, that is, they can be alienated only by deed.”). 
 63. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Ga. 1996) (holding that a life 
tenant forfeited his estate in favor of the remaindermen given the life tenant’s failure to pay real 
estate taxes). 
 64. See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 330–35 (discussing blocking patents and how this 
corresponds to similar situations in tangible property rights). 
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extensive litigation known today as a “patent thicket.”65 In terms of 
legal doctrine, future interests are governed by hyper-technical and 
formalistic legal rules, and, as property lawyers are wont to point out, 
such rules refer only to the abstract legal right created in the conveyance 
instrument, not to the land.66 Again, patent lawyers should feel right at 
home here, because the legal construction of hyper-technical patent 
claims is at the core of every infringement lawsuit. As the Federal 
Circuit puts the point, “the name of the game is the claim.”67 
The many cases involving disputes over estates and future interests 
dramatically reveal these points of similarity between the interests 
secured in real estate and patents. To take just one illustrative example: 
in Illinois in the mid-1970s, a dispute arose over who owned a future 
interest in a fee simple defeasible, as the interest was transferred under 
different circumstances and at different times to different parties.68 
Similar to the rules governing construction of all legal documents, 
including patents,69 the court followed the uncontroversial proposition 
that the interpretation of deeds “is solely a matter of judicial 
interpretation of the words of a grant.”70  
As in all property disputes concerning estate interests, the parties in 
this case heavily disputed the meaning of the words used in the deed.71 
Of course, the language was neither clear nor straightforward, as is 
often the case in these lawsuits. This is why there is litigation, as there 
are colorable arguments on both sides of the dispute. Ultimately, the 
court concluded that  
a close analysis of the wording of the original grant shows 
that . . . . the use of the word “only” immediately following 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: 
The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011). 
 66. See Wood v. Leadbitter, [1845] 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch.) 354, 13 M. & W. 838, 842 
(“That no incorporeal inheritance affecting land can either be created or transferred otherwise 
than by deed, is a proposition so well established, that it would be mere pedantry to cite 
authorities in its support. All such inheritances are said emphatically to lie in grant, and not in 
livery [of seisin] . . . .”); cf. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 60, at 182 (“The development of the 
fee simple estate is an example of that most striking phenomenon of English land law, the 
reification of abstractions, a process of thinking that still pervades our law. Instead of thinking 
of the land itself, the lawyer thinks of an estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a 
real existence apart from the land.”). 
 67. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American 
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)). 
 68. See Mahrenholz v. Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 417 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
 69. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).  
 70. Mahrenholz, 417 N.E.2d at 141. 
 71. Id. at 142–45 (reviewing the parties’ competing arguments). 
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the grant “for school purpose” demonstrates that the 
Huttons wanted to give the land to the school district only 
as long as it was needed and no longer. . . . It suggests a 
limited grant, rather than a full grant subject to a condition, 
and thus, both theoretically and linguistically, gives rise to 
a fee simple determinable.72 
This type of formalistic, linguistic analysis of a deed is quite 
common in property law disputes, and state reporters are littered with 
opinions just like this one. Patent lawyers should find such arguments to 
be quite familiar, as these arguments are very similar to the rules and 
practices they face each day when courts or officials at the Patent & 
Trademark Office parse the words and grammatical structures of claims, 
applying definitions as well as grammatical and legal rules. In sum, the 
descriptive similarities between patents and future interests are palpable, 
which explains why nineteenth-century courts relied on real property 
cases, or at least analogized patent doctrines to real property doctrines, 
in creating parallel doctrines in patent law. 
Beyond these similarities between patents and estate interests, there 
are other doctrines that define the boundaries of an estate without 
reference to either fences or the physical invasion that constitutes a 
trespass. For example, the owner of an easement can breach the larger 
estate in which the right of way exists without overstepping a single 
physical boundary line. All that is required is that the easement owner 
merely increases the “scope of use” of the easement, which is a breach 
of the estate boundaries along the functional dimension in terms of the 
scope of the use right originally created in the easement.73 In such cases, 
courts have no problem identifying the legal wrong as a “trespass” in 
the strictly legal sense of the term, referring to a legal violation of the 
boundaries of an estate interest.74 But this is certainly not the sense of 
“trespass” employed by laypersons or patent lawyers, who think of only 
broken fences and physical invasions. Another example is the well-
known action for nuisance—a substantial and unreasonable interference 
with another person’s use and enjoyment of land—which is a very 
common way that an estate can be violated without a breach of a fence 
or a physical invasion of the land.75 One scholar explored recently how 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 142. 
 73. See, e.g., Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986). 
 74. See, e.g., Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 233 (Va. 1946) (stating that 
“every use of an easement not necessarily included in the grant is a trespass to realty and renders 
the owner of the dominant tenement liable”); Brown, 715 P.2d at 518 (Dore, J., dissenting) 
(“Misuse of an easement is a trespass.”). 
 75. See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) (“If the intrusion 
interferes with the right to exclusive possession of property, the law of trespass applies. If the 
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nuisance doctrine illuminates the same policy concerns about 
information costs in the structure of patent infringement doctrine,76 but 
this comparison beyond the conventional contrast between patent 
infringement and trespass is the exception, not the rule. 
Courts and commentators probably fail to see these many 
correlations and instead find the trespass fallacy so appealing because it 
reflects symmetry between the exclusionary right in a patent and the 
exclusionary right in real estate. Today, patents and real estate are both 
deemed to secure an owner’s right to exclude others from the subject 
matter of the property right.77 But the framing of patent infringement as 
trespass is only an analogy, as evidenced by early American courts’ 
using the trespass analogy long before American patents specifically 
defined the peripheral boundaries of the property right in formal 
“claims.”78 The characterization of patent infringement as “trespass” in 
Antebellum Era case law—when a patent described the “principle” of 
an invention79—underscores how courts and commentators at that time 
used this term only as an analogy for framing the protection of patents 
as property rights (as opposed to personal privileges or franchise 
monopoly grants).80 Ironically, while criticizing the use of property 
metaphors as obfuscating policy issues in intellectual property law,81 
                                                                                                                     
intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of property, the law of nuisance applies.”); 
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1002 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“Nuisance is not 
contingent upon whether the defendant physically impinged on plaintiff’s property, but whether 
the defendant substantially and unreasonably interfered with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of its 
property.”); cf. Adam Mossoff, Spam—Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 
646–54 (2004) (discussing how the legal harm imposed by spam is properly characterized as a 
nuisance as opposed to a trespass). 
 76. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 
61 (2009). 
 77. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (identifying the right to 
exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of 
‘property.’”); see also Mossoff, supra note 4, at 327–30, 360–64 (explaining how real property 
and patents are both defined in modern property theory as essentially securing a right to 
exclude). 
 78. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (discussing 
how claims did not originally exist in American patent law). 
 79. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617–18 (C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1,506) 
(instructing a jury that “in his specification, the patentee explains the principle embodied in his 
machine, in other words, the novel characteristics or inventive elements of the machine” 
(emphasis added)). 
 80. See generally Mossoff, Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege,” supra note 27, at 989–
1009 (identifying how American courts, legislators, and commentators historically justified 
patents as property rights within natural rights theory). 
 81. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. 
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patent scholars have converted the trespass analogy into the trespass 
fallacy and thus obfuscated what it means to define and secure a patent 
as a property right.  
In sum, a comparison between patents and real estate should 
comprise all doctrines that define and secure the boundaries of these 
respective titles. This certainly includes trespass, but this single doctrine 
is not sufficient. As the Colorado Supreme Court aptly observed, 
“Property, in its broader and more appropriate sense, is not alone the 
chattel or the land itself, but the right to freely possess, use, and alienate 
the same.”82 If the boundaries of patents are to be compared to the 
boundaries of real estate, then commentators and judges must include 
the doctrines that secure the temporal, geographic, and functional 
dimensions and which together define the scope of a property right 
secured in an estate. The trespass fallacy must be discarded and the 
comparisons made anew based on the proper conceptual counterpart to 
patents—estates. Commentators and judges should stop talking about 
patent boundaries in terms of fences, as this analogy has led them 
astray, and instead they should be talking about estate boundaries.  
B.  Trespass as an Unverified Empirical Metric 
If patent scholars and economists make a proper comparison 
between patent boundaries and estate boundaries, they must still 
empirically verify whether estate boundaries are as clear and 
determinate as they assume them to be. In all empirical studies, the 
omnipresent question is always: As compared to what?83 The trespass 
fallacy is invalid not just because it reflects the logical fallacy of a 
category mistake, but also because it reflects a metric for empirically 
assessing the operation of the patent system that is completely 
unsubstantiated and unverified. In short, there are no empirical studies 
of how trespass functions in real-world litigation, and there certainly are 
no empirical studies of the proper metric that scholars should be using 
in their comparative statics of the patent system—estate boundaries. 
Surprisingly, patent scholars have been engaging in substantial 
                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 1031, 1071 (2005) (“My worry is that the rhetoric of property has a clear meaning in the 
minds of courts, lawyers, and commentators as ‘things that are owned by persons’ and that fixed 
meaning will make it all too tempting to fall into the trap of treating intellectual property as an 
absolute right to exclude.”). 
 82. City of Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6, 6–7 (Colo. 1883) (emphasis omitted). 
 83. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities 
in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7–9), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117421 (critiquing a study by Professors Bessen and Meurer on the 
costs of litigation by nonpracticing entities for failing properly to establish that nonpracticing 
entity litigation costs are “statistically different from some other number” because they 
“unrealistic[ally] . . . assume that the costs should be zero”). 
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empirical studies of the patent system in recent years, but they have 
been merely asserting without any proof that real estate boundaries are 
stable, determinate, and efficient. One of the most extensive empirical 
studies of the modern patent system is by Professors Bessen and 
Meurer, as presented in their book, Patent Failure.84 They infer the 
indeterminacy critique from their study and thus call for wide-ranging 
reforms of the patent system.85 As previously noted, they invoke the 
trespass fallacy in this book,86 but what is perhaps most surprising is 
that they do so on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Although 
they carefully collected extensive data on the issuance and litigation of 
patents, they do not offer a single formal empirical study to verify their 
assertion that “[r]eal property law gives landowners a clear view of 
property boundaries,” and thus one “rarely hear[s] about lawsuits 
caused because someone inadvertently built a structure on, or made 
some other investment within the boundaries of, another’s property.”87 
In support of this empirical claim about how real property boundaries 
function at all times and in every common law jurisdiction in the United 
States, they offer the following statement in a single endnote: “Over the 
past three years there have been only four lawsuits in California 
concerning good-faith improvement of land.”88 This is it. There are no 
statistical or other empirical studies cited to support this claim, either 
limited to California or to any other jurisdiction for that matter.  
Unfortunately, Professors Bessen and Meurer’s lack of concern for 
providing any proper evidence in support of their invocation of the 
trespass standard is not unusual among scholars today. Patent scholars 
often assert similarly unsubstantiated claims that real property 
boundaries function clearly and efficiently in the real world.89 
It is not for lack of available evidence that such studies have not 
been done. As Justice Stephen Breyer recently observed in an important 
2010 decision, “[p]roperty owners litigate many thousands of cases 
involving state property law in state courts each year,” and, tellingly, he 
further recognized that “such cases can involve state property law issues 
of considerable complexity.”90 The few empirical studies on real estate 
                                                                                                                     
 84. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2. 
 85. Id. at 235–53. 
 86. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 87. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 51.  
 88. Id. at 266 n.8. 
 89. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 36 at 530 (“Property rights generally have a degree of 
stability to facilitate investment by their owners and others.”); Lemley, supra note 41, at 1100 
(“One of the reasons we are reasonably confident that the law of real property works is that both 
the physical and legal boundaries of real property are, in the main, clear.”). 
 90. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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boundaries and casual surveys of anecdotal evidence suggest that 
Justice Breyer’s observation on the substantial number and complexity 
of real estate boundary disputes carries more truth than the assumption 
of patent scholars to the contrary.91 It bears emphasizing, though, that 
even if patent scholars eventually produce empirical studies on trespass 
lawsuits throughout the United States, there still remains the conceptual 
fallacy in using trespass doctrine as the sole metric in evaluating the 
patent system. Thus, for the indeterminacy critique to have any traction 
beyond appeals to simplistic and unverified intuitions that trespass 
works efficiently via the crystal-clear signaling function of fences, the 
empirical studies have to assess how estate boundaries are defined and 
adjudicated in real-world disputes.  
This requires data collection and modeling of how estate boundaries 
work along two different axes of measurement. Before identifying these 
two axes of measurement, it bears noting that a full empirical study is 
beyond the scope of this Essay; in fact, to attempt to present a complete 
study of estate boundary disputes in this section would result in the 
same conceptual and empirical problems identified in this Essay. Thus, 
what follows is only a summary of the various factors that such a study 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of 
Coordinating Institutions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. l4942), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401787 (identifying differing economic effects between 
rectangular system and metes and bounds for demarcating boundaries of real property); see also 
Tami Abdolla & Maria L. La Ganga, Building a Fence Is His Big Offense, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/29/local/me-house29 (reporting that a homeowner 
was sentenced to jail for six months for building a fence in violation of municipal codes in 
California); Molly Moorhead, Feud over Fence in Middle of Hudson Road May Go to Trial, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 9, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/feud-
over-fence-in-middle-of-hudson-road-may-go-to-trial/1072038 (reporting ongoing boundary 
dispute in Florida); Jerry Seper, 16 Illegals Sue Arizona Rancher, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/9/16-illegals-sue-arizona-rancher (reporting 
on how a rancher was sued for apprehending illegal immigrants trespassing on his land in 
Arizona); James Eli Shiffer, Whistleblower: Drawing the Line in Land Squabble, STAR TRIB. 
(June 13, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/96222009.html 
(reporting ongoing and highly emotional boundary dispute in Minnesota); Brandon Shulleeta, 
Crozet Square Dispute Still Unresolved, DAILY PROGRESS (June 30, 2010, 4:47 AM), 
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/article_3fb99225-58b5-5979-9017-afd948334b 
9b.html (“Crozet business owners had been struck with panic—witnessing a railroad company 
claim ownership of their shopping center parking lot and erecting a fence—and the property 
dispute remains unresolved now a month later.”); Paul Sullivan, Somebody’s Watching . . . and 
Ready to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/your-
money/05wealth.html (discussing hundreds of thousands of dollars being spent in Connecticut 
in a boundary dispute involving a stone wall); Superior Man Arrested for Trespassing on His 
Own Land, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Dec. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24539844 (reporting 
how a landowner was arrested for criminal trespass for interfering with a public utility easement 
on his land). 
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would have to account for, with some citations to show that such legal 
and factual disputes over real estate boundaries are both common and 
quite significant today.  
First, data on all of the relevant doctrines that comprise estate 
boundaries must be collected and tested to determine if they confirm the 
asserted hypothesis that estate boundaries are determinate and efficient 
vis-à-vis indeterminate and inefficient patent boundaries. For this claim 
to be sufficiently robust, the data must capture all of the ways that estate 
boundaries are defined and disputed, including disputes concerning 
trespass,92 adverse possession,93 easements,94 restrictive covenants,95 
and nuisance,96 among other doctrines identified in the previous section. 
Most important, it would have to include the innumerable interpretative 
disputes over the wills, deeds, and conveyance instruments that define 
these boundaries along the multi-dimensions of an estate. As property 
attorneys know, many property disputes comprise linguistic fights over 
the legal definitions of estates and related legal terms of art in property 
law—similar to the linguistic fights in patent law over the meaning of 
claim terms.97 As Frederick Pollock and Robert Wright observed in 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1306, 1308 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (affirming judgment holding defendant liable in trespass action for almost $1.9 
million in damages, punitive damages of $17.5 million, and attorneys’ fees in excess of $1 
million). 
 93. See, e.g., Sag Harbor Village to Bid on MTA Parcel, SAG HARBOR EXPRESS (July 16, 
2010), http://sagharboronline.com/sagharborexpress/page-1/sag-harbor-village-to-bid-on-mta-
parcel-8542 (discussing ongoing adverse possession dispute in property concurrently being 
auctioned by local authorities). 
 94. See, e.g., Sampair v. Vill. of Birchwood, 784 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 2010) (resolving 
dispute over lakeshore access between landowners and easement owners); Jenna Russell, 
Wrangling over Ancient Ways, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 
2629127 (discussing long-running disputes over easements on Martha’s Vineyard). 
 95. See, e.g., Jordan Schrader, Clotheslines a Hang-up for Some Communities, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-09-07-clotheslines_N.htm. 
 96. See, e.g., Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1188, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming an order remanding to state court a nuisance claim involving 409 plaintiffs); Powell 
v. Tosh, 280 F.R.D. 296, 300 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (certifying a class action in a nuisance lawsuit 
against a hog farm); Justin Jouvenal, Fairfax County Church Takes Action Against TopGolf 
Driving Range for Wayward Golf Balls, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-05/local/35282128_1_joe-vrankin-special-grand-
jury-church-property (reporting how a church is formally accusing a local golf range of being a 
public nuisance); ‘Neighbour from Hell’ Madonna Accused of Turning Her £4M NYC Home into 
Rehearsal Space, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-
1221249/Neighbour-hell-Madonna-accused-turning-4m-NYC-home-rehearsal-space.html (reporting 
on nuisance-style interferences between neighboring tenants in skyscrapers); Teri Karush Rogers, 
The Big Mistake, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/realestate/06 
cov.html (same). 
 97. See, e.g., Bailey v. Town of Saltville, 691 S.E.2d 491, 491, 494 (Va. 2010) (resolving 
dispute over whether the language in a deed granted an easement or a fee simple); Burdette v. 
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their famous 1888 treatise, An Essay on Possession in the Common 
Law, “Few title-deeds are so precise in their description of the property 
dealt with as to leave nothing uncertain.”98 
The ubiquitous terminological disputes concerning the scope of 
estate boundaries are a stark reminder that the conventional wisdom 
about the allegedly unparalleled debacle in claim interpretation 
jurisprudence is untested and unverified. Perhaps this complaint 
represents merely a pining for an idealized certainty in language that is 
just not possible in any legal document that creates legal entitlements, 
whether a title deed, a statute, or a patent.99 Perhaps not. Perhaps it 
represents a pining for an unrealistic, idealized certainty in litigation 
generally.100 Perhaps not.  
To this day, the vitally important question remains unanswered: Do 
patents secure boundaries in inventions with the same certainty as title 
deeds secure boundaries in real estate? It is time to properly test 
whether there is unacceptable indeterminacy or not in the functioning of 
patents as property rights 
Second, a proper empirical study of estate boundaries must also 
guard against self-selection bias in focusing solely on court cases 
arising from formal complaints asserting property-based causes of 
action.101 In addition to the many boundary disputes that are resolved at 
the stage in which attorneys exchange letters or even before a trial 
occurs, many property disputes are channeled today through various 
                                                                                                                     
Brush Mountain Estates, LLC, 682 S.E.2d 549, 551, 555–56 (Va. 2009) (holding that a 
conveyance deed containing the express words “PRIVATE EASEMENT . . . IS HEREBY 
CONVEYED” did not create an easement given that the plat did not specify with precision the 
burden imposed by the easement and the plat showed the easement covering land not included 
in the original survey of the parcel); see also Confused Land Records Lead to Dueling Deeds, 
ROCKBRIDGE ADVOC., March 2008, at 1, 6–10 (on file with author); Roger Vincent, Downtown 
L.A. Building Set to Go from Drug Den to Luxury Inn, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/23/business/la-fi-downtown-hotel-20120223 (reporting on 
how development of a valuable parcel was held up for many years given “difficulty figuring out 
who held its title as competing parties claimed control”). 
 98. POLLOCK & WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 30. 
 99. Cf. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(“[I]f the language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can demand no more.”). 
 100. At a minimum, the substantial reversal rate in claim construction cases complained 
about by patent scholars and judges, see supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text, is consistent 
with the famous Priest–Klein hypothesis that litigation generally approaches a 50% win-loss 
rate. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 101. In addition to the lack of any formal support for their empirical claim about the 
alleged clarity of real estate boundaries, Bessen and Meurer’s informal review of trespass court 
cases in California between 2005 and 2008 suffers from obvious self-selection effects that they 
do not control for. This is a similar problem to the self-selection effects in their 2012 study of 
nonpracticing entity litigation. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 83, at 4–6. 
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dispute-resolution mechanisms outside of the classic lawsuit filed with 
the clerk in the local courthouse. This includes informal mechanisms, 
such as the operation of social norms that resolve boundary disputes 
without formal court action,102 and a variety of formal mechanisms 
within the modern administrative state, such as zoning, environmental 
regulations, and other statutes and regulations that establish nonjudicial 
processes to resolve property disputes.103  
To date, no patent or property scholar has done a formal study along 
either of these two axes of measurement. Thus, commentators 
advancing the trespass fallacy have been engaging in comparative 
statistics in which one side has been carefully studied with extensive 
data collection (patent law) and the other side is almost completely 
barren of any facts (property law). In these studies, commentators have 
been merely restating the idealized theory of how the right to exclude 
functions within trespass doctrine, as it is formally conceptualized 
within the economic analysis of property law.104 Commentators 
invoking the trespass fallacy simply assume that this classic “property 
rule” doctrine works clearly and efficiently.105 In economic terms, the 
nirvana fallacy is omnipresent in much empirical scholarship on the 
modern patent system.  
Aside from the conceptual problems inherent in relying on trespass 
doctrine to evaluate patents, an idealized theory about one legal doctrine 
(trespass) is not a commensurate standard for doing comparative 
                                                                                                                     
 102. See, e.g., Drew Grant, D’Amico Coffee Loses Battle over Carroll Gardens’ (Coffee) 
Grounds, N.Y. OBSERVER (May 28, 2012), http://observer.com/2012/05/damico-coffee-loses-
battle-over-carroll-gardens-grounds (describing how local residents, upset by the smell, shut 
down a local coffee shop’s activities by repeatedly making false reports to the fire department); 
see also JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48–49, 73–76, 142–44 (1988); 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
 103. See, e.g., Abdolla & La Ganga, supra note 91 (reporting that a homeowner was 
sentenced to jail for six months for building a fence in violation of municipal building codes); 
Matt Miller, Food Truck Wars, DAILY CALLER (Apr. 27, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/04/ 
27/food-truck-wars/ (reporting on restaurant owners around the country using zoning laws to 
eliminate competition from food trucks); Paul Muschick, Zoning Feud Nears End in Allen Twp., 
MORNING CALL (Jan. 14, 2010), http://articles.mcall.com/2010-01-14/news/all-online19ndh-a-
a.7146058jan14_1_zoning-feud-township-manager-and-zoning-zoning-officer (reporting on a 
“long-running zoning feud” in Allen Township, Pennsylvania); Tom Ramstack, Church Sues 
District over Landmark, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/ 
aug/8/church-sues-district-over-landmark (reporting on how a local church is challenging its legal 
designation as a historical landmark).  
 104. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 356 (1967) (observing that “private ownership of land will internalize 
many of the external costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of 
his power to exclude others, . . . . [has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently” 
(emphasis added)). 
 105. See supra notes 38–41, 87–89 and accompanying text. 
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empirical studies of another legal right (patents). As Professors Bessen 
and Meurer rightly state, “The problem with mistaking abstract 
conceptions of property for the real thing is that this substitutes rhetoric 
for reasoned policy . . . .”106 Unfortunately, their study is rife with the 
trespass fallacy, and so they are not following their own advice. If the 
empirical studies of the patent system are to have a proper explanatory 
function, whether in making the indeterminacy critique or in asserting 
any other claim about patents, then they have to answer the vital 
question: As compared to what? As of yet, this question is unanswered 
because the proper estate boundary standard remains empirically 
unverified. Of course, it is easy to solve this problem. To borrow 
Professors Bessen and Meurer’s own mantra, “The antidote is empirical 
evidence . . . .”107 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom is that the patent system is broken and 
requires immediate action to reform it before irreparable harm is done to 
both innovation and economic growth in the country. One of the 
primary problems, according to many, is that patents today are infected 
with vagueness and indeterminacy. As the reform advocates repeatedly 
put the point, “The primary objective of reform should be to reduce the 
uncertainty that now pervades many aspects of the patent system.”108 
The widespread calls for reform by academics, policy activists, lawyers, 
and commercial firms have prompted the Supreme Court, the Congress, 
and the Patent & Trademark Office to spring into action in recent years, 
attempting to address the perceived breakdown in the patent system 
with a plethora of fixes both doctrinal and institutional.  
The problem is that the charges of rampant indeterminacy in the 
patent system are predicated on a fallacy—an improper and unverified 
comparison of patent infringement with trespass doctrine. Logically, 
this commits a category mistake, as it assumes that the boundaries of 
title—whether a property right in an invention or in land—are defined 
solely by a single doctrine of trespass subsumed within this property 
right. As property lawyers well know, trespass is only one of many 
doctrines, including easements, restrictive covenants, and nuisance, 
among others, that secure estate boundaries along their geographic, 
temporal and functional dimensions. Empirically, there are no formal 
studies of how trespass doctrine functions in litigation, nor are there any 
studies of the proper comparative concept of how estate boundaries 
                                                                                                                     
 106. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 257. 
 107. Id. 
 108. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 171. 
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function in litigation. Commentators are committing the nirvana fallacy 
in their comparative statics—comparing actual empirical data from the 
patent system with an idealized theory of how trespass should be 
functioning. In sum, the indeterminacy critique is the product of a 
fallacy in patent law today—the trespass fallacy. 
If one believes that there is value in the policy insights obtained from 
comparisons between different types of property rights, then the 
trespass fallacy should be discarded in favor of a proper descriptive and 
empirical account of estate boundaries. As the legal realists reminded us 
so long ago, normative assessments of the law are “empty without 
objective description of the causes and consequences of legal 
decisions.”109 As of now, there is no objective description of real estate 
to support the comparative claim in the indeterminacy critique that 
patents are failing as property rights. Until firm factual grounding for 
this normative critique is first established, commentators, legislators and 
courts might want to pause before continuing to make fundamental 
structural changes to the American patent system. 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 849 (1935). 
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